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AGE DISCRIMINATION
Can the Disparate Impact Method
of Proving Discrimination Establish
an ADEA Violation?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 304-306. © 2002 American Bar Association.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis.,
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377, and co-author
of West's Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions (5th edition).
Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEWs deadline.
ISSUE
Is the disparate impact method of
proving age discrimination available
to plaintiffs suing under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act?
FACTS
The Florida Power Corporation
(FPC) terminated Wanda Adams and
other employees between 1992 and
1996 because of a series of reorgani-
zations that FPC says were neces-
sary to maintain its competitiveness
in the newly deregulated electric
utility market. More than 70 per-
cent of the terminated employees
were over the age of 40.
In 1996, Adams and 117 former
employees (the Adams group) over
the age of 40 brought a class action
against FPC in federal district court,
claiming that it had discriminated
against them because of their age in
violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA).
According to the plaintiffs, FPC had
violated the ADEA by (1) willfully
discriminating against senior
employees on the basis of their age,
and (2) disparately impacting older
employees. FPC denied any viola-
tion of the ADEA and asserted that
it had legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for firing the Adams group.
Specifically, FPC asserted that it
had undergone a series of reorgani-
zations, not to trim the workplace of
older workers, but to prepare for the
competition that utility deregulation
would bring it within the state of
Florida.
The district court conditionally cer-
tified the class in 1996. Two years
later, the district court decertified
the class, holding that disparate
impact analysis was not available
under the ADEA and that the class
members could not be deemed
"similarly situated," as required for
class certification, unless their
claims could be premised on a theo-
ry of disparate impact. The district
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ADAMS ET AL. V. FLORIDA POWER
CORP. ET AL.
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ARGUMENT DATE:
MARCH 20, 2002
FROM: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
court certified the question con-
cerning the existence of ADEA dis-
parate impact analysis to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit because the question pre-
sented a controlling issue of law in
the case, and the circuits were
remarkably divided on the issue.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court, holding
that disparate impact claims may
not be brought under the ADEA.
255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001). The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the
ADEA's exception for "reasonable
factors other than age" does not
exist in Title VII and is similar to an
exception in the Equal Pay Act that
the Supreme Court has interpreted
as precluding disparate impact
claims. County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71
(1981). The Eleventh Circuit also
found that the Supreme Court in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993), while leav-
ing open the question of whether a
disparate impact claim can be
brought under the ADEA, suggested
that no disparate impact claim
could be brought under the ADEA.
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted Adams's petition requesting
review of the Eleventh Circuit's
decision. 122 S.Ct. 643 (2001).
CASE ANALYSIS
When Congress passed Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it com-
missioned a study by the Secretary
of Labor on age discrimination in
the workplace. Thereafter, the
ADEA was enacted "as part of an
ongoing congressional effort to erad-
icate discrimination in the work-
place, reflect[ing] a societal con-
demnation of invidious bias in
employment decisions." McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995). The
ADEA broadly prohibits arbitrary
discrimination in the workplace
based on age. Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment because of
such individual's age" (29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1)), or "to limit, segregate,
or classify ... employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or othervise
adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individ-
ual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).
In a "disparate treatment" case
under the ADEA, liability depends
on whether age actually motivated
the employer's decision. On the oth-
er hand, a "disparate impact" age
discrimination claim involves
employment practices that,
although facially neutral, have had
an adverse impact on employees at
least 40 years of age. The disparate
impact theory of liability provides a
means for members of protected
classes to prove that discrimination
occurred in the workplace even
when proof of motive is difficult or
unavailable.
Adams argues that the ADEA per-
mits older workers to prove age dis-
crimination by showing that the
employer's action has had a dis-
parate impact on older workers.
According to Adams, the language in
the ADEA imposing liability for
employment practices that
"adversely" affect an employee's sta-
tus expressly permits claims based
on disparate impact. In addition,
Adams contends that the ADEA's
prohibitions and related affirmative
defenses strongly indicate that dis-
parate impact is an available means
of proving age discrimination.
The language of § 623(0(1) of the
ADEA is similar to language found
in the Equal Pay Act. Section
206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act pro-
vides that wage discrimination on
the basis of gender is prohibited
unless the wage "differential [is]
based on any other factor other
than sex." The Supreme Court
interpreted this language to pre-
clude disparate impact claims under
the Equal Pay Act. County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 170-71 (1981). However, while
the Equal Pay Act merely requires
the employer to provide a neutral
explanation for any disparity in the
pay of male and female employees,
§ 623(0(1) of the ADEA requires an
employer to demonstrate the rea-
sonableness of any such neutral fac-
tor. According to Adams, the
Supreme Court's analysis in
Gunther therefore should be applied
to permit the use of disparate
impact under the ADEA.
Adams argues that the ADEA's "rea-
sonable factors" defense applies
only if the factors upon which an
employer based its discriminatory
action were both (a) not age based
and (b) reasonable. It is Adams's
position that the necessary corollary
to this defense is that it does not
apply if the employer based its
action on factors that were not "rea-
sonable" even if the factors were
"other than age."
The Florida Power Corporation, on
the other hand, argues that the
"reasonable factors other than age"
provision in the ADEA is a "defini-
tional provision" that "delineates
which employment practices are
illegal and thereby prohibited and
which are not." Adams disagrees,
arguing that the provision creates
an affirmative defense against dis-
parate impact claims.
(Continued on Page 306)
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Contending that the FPC's method
of downsizing was highly subjective,
Adams argues that it would be
extremely challenging for many
members of the Adams group to
prove discrimination by disparate
treatment even if they were dis-
missed because of a culture of
ageism that subtly pervaded the
workplace.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court has held that
Title VII supports a cause of action
for employment discrimination
based on a disparate impact method
of proving discrimination. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). In a case involving liquidat-
ed damages under the ADEA, how-
ever, the Court explicitly left open
the question of whether a disparate
impact theory of liability is also
available under the ADEA. Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
610 (1993). See generally O'Malley,
Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions 483-84 (5th ed.
2001).
Several circuits have held that
because the language of the ADEA
closely parallels Title VII, disparate
impact claims also should be
allowed under the ADEA. See Smith
v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367
(2d Cir. 1999); EEOC v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950
(8th Cir. 1999); Arnett v. California
Public Employees Retirement
System, 179 F.3d 690 (9th Cir.
1999), judgment vacated on other
grounds, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000);
Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216
F.3d, 856 n.11 (9th Cir. 2000).
On the other hand, in addition to
the Eleventh Circuit, five other cir-
cuits have questioned the viability
of disparate impact claims under
the ADEA. Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,
164 F.3d 696, 700-01 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999);
DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir.
1995); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 53
F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995);
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School,
41 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (7th Cir.
1994); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.,
73 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (10th Cir.
1996). The Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have not addressed the
issue.
Courts that question the viability of
a disparate impact claim under the
ADEA recognize that, while there
are important similarities between
the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the text of the
ADEA differs from Title VII. They
note that an important difference
between the two is that the language
in Section 623(0(1) of the ADEA
provides that an employer may
"take any action otherwise prohibit-
ed ... where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other
than age." The First Circuit has
explained that, if the exception in
Section 623(0(1) "is not understood
to preclude disparate impact liabili-
ty, it becomes nothing more than a
bromide to the effect that 'only age
discrimination is age discrimina-
tion.'" Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164
F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999).
Although it does not contain the
express "reasonable factors" defense
contained in the ADEA, Title VII
requires an employer to demon-
strate that its challenged practice is
a job-related business necessity. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971) (disparate impact is
a basis for relief under Title VII only
if the practice in question is not
founded on "business necessity" or
lacks "a manifest relationship to the
employment"). The EEOC interpre-
tive guidelines (29 C.F.R. §
1625.7(d)) suggest that the ADEA's
reasonable factors defense works in
tandem with Title VII's business
necessity defense.
A ruling upholding the Eleventh
Circuit's decision would make it
easier for employers to defend
against employment discrimination
by requiring plaintiffs to prove dis-
criminatory intent. On the other
hand, a holding that the ADEA
encompasses both disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact claims
would make it easier for plaintiffs to
establish violations of the ADEA.
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